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# TrustedBSD MAC Framework on FreeBSD and Darwin

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# Introduction

- TrustedBSD Project, McAfee Research
- Rationale for Security Extensions
- TrustedBSD MAC Framework
- Porting MAC Framework to Darwin



# **TrustedBSD Project**

#### Goal: Trusted system features to FreeBSD

- Security Infrastructure Dependencies
  - UFS2 + extattr, OpenPAM, NSS, GEOM + GBDE, ...
  - Privilege and structural improvements
- Security Features
  - Discretionary Access Control Lists (ACLs)
  - Extensible Access Control (MAC Framework)
  - Mandatory Access Control policies (MAC)
  - Security Event Auditing (Audit)

Secondary Goal: Support organizations evaluating products based on FreeBSD MCAFEE Research



## **McAfee Research**

- A leading commercial security R&D lab
  - Started out as Trusted Information Systems (TIS)
  - Along the way, TIS Labs, NAI Labs, Network Associates Laboratories, and now McAfee Research
  - Primarily R&D sponsored by US government agencies, such as DARPA, NSA, Army, Navy, DHS, VA, and others
  - Also security R&D under contract to commercial customers, such as Apple, Microsoft, and others
  - Defensive technology research into networks, operating systems, distributed systems, wireless, crypto, et al.

- Very interested in, and supportive of open source




# R&D in Operating System Security Extensibility and Hardening DARPA CHATS: CBOSS

- Composable High Assurance Trusted Systems
- Community-Based Open Source Security
- Security extensibility, architecture, tech transfer
  - TrustedBSD MAC Framework
  - PRIVMAN Library for privilege separation
- Hardening and infrastructure
  - IPsec, UFS2, cryptographic storage, OpenPAM
- Various follow-on relating to MAC Framework, FLASK/TE
  - Several other sponsors for follow-ons



## **CBOSS: Tech Transfer Flow**





# Outline

#### TrustedBSD MAC Framework

- Framework for operating system access control extension

## Security-Enhanced BSD Prototype

 Port of NSA's FLASK/TE from SELinux to MAC Framework

#### TrustedBSD MAC Framework port to Darwin

- Apple's open source kernel for OS X operating system

## Security-Enhanced Darwin Prototype

- SEBSD ported to run on Darwin using MAC Framework



# **Rationale for Security Extensions**

- Common FreeBSD deployment scenarios
  - Banks, multi-user ISP environments
  - -Web-hosting cluster, firewalls
  - "High-end embedded"
- Many of these scenarios have requirements poorly addressed by traditional UNIX security
  - OS hardening
  - Mandatory protection
  - Flexible, manageable, scalable protection





## Why a MAC Framework?

- Support required in operating system for new security services
  - Costs of locally maintaining security extensions are high
  - Framework offers extensibility so that policies may be enhanced without changing base operating system
- There does not appear to be one perfect security model or policy
  - Sites may have different security/performance trade-offs
  - Sites may have special local requirements
  - Third party and research products




# **MAC Framework Background**

#### Extensible security framework

- Policies implemented as modules
- Common policy infrastructure like labeling
- Sample policy modules, such as Biba, MLS, TE, hardening policies, et al.
- Composes multiple policies if present
- Also provides APIs for label-aware and possibly policyagnostic applications
- Shipped in FreeBSD 5.0-5.3
- Considered experimental, but quite usable





### **Kernel MAC Framework**





# Policy Entry Point Invocation Policy-Agnostic Labeling Abstraction







# **TrustedBSD MAC Framework: Objects**

- Broad range of system objects can be labeled and/or controlled
  - Subjects (processes/credentials, NFS clients, etc)
  - IPC (pipes, sockets, SysVIPC, POSIX semaphores)
  - Network objects (mbufs, interfaces, BPF queues, pcbs, IP fragment queues, IPSEC security associations)
  - File system objects (mountpoints, vnodes, devfs nodes, UFS inodes)
- Objects have life cycle entry points, access control check entry points





# Modifications to FreeBSD to Introduce MAC Framework

- A variety of architectural cleanups
  - Audit and minimize use of privilege
  - Centralize inter-process access control
  - Centralize discretionary access control for files
  - Clean up System V IPC permission functions
  - Prefer controlled and explicit export interfaces to kmem
  - Combine \*cred structures into ucred; adopt td\_ucred
  - Correct many semantic errors relating to credentials
  - Support moves to kernel threading, fine-grained locking, SMP



# Modifications to FreeBSD to add the MAC Framework (cont)


#### Infrastructure components

- Add support for extended attributes in UFS1; build UFS2
- Actual MAC Framework changes
  - Instrument kernel objects for labeling, access control
  - Instrument kernel objects for misc. life cycle events
  - Create MAC Framework components (policy registration, composition, label infrastructure, system calls, ...)
  - Create sample policy modules
  - Provide userspace tools to exercise new system calls

– Modify login mechanisms, user databases, etc.



## Integration of MAC Framework into FreeBSD





# **Sample Policy Modules**

- mac\_test regression test, stub, null modules
  Traditional labeled MAC policies
  - Biba fixed-label integrity, LOMAC floating-label integrity
  - Hierarchal and compartmented Multi-Level Security (MLS)
  - SELinux FLASK/TE "SEBSD"
- Hardening policies
  - File system "firewall"
  - Interface silencing
  - Port ACLs

McAfee Research partitions



## Where next for the MAC Framework?

- Continue to research and develop TrustedBSD MAC Framework on FreeBSD
  - Enhanced support for IPsec
  - Improve productionability of policy modules
  - Continued R&D for SEBSD
  - Integrate with Audit functionality



# **SEBSD: Security-Enhanced BSD**

- Sponsored port of SELinux functionality to the FreeBSD platform
  - Port SELinux policy language and access control model
  - Implement FLASK/TE in a MAC Framework policy module
  - Provide result as open source



# **SELinux Background**

#### FLASK security framework

- FLASK provides an access control framework abstraction
- Initially integrated directly into Linux kernel
- Now plugged in using "LSM" framework
- Implements Type Enforcement (TE) Policy
  - Extensive and comprehensive rule language and policy configuration
  - Mature policy documents privileges for many userspace system components and common applications
  - Also limited MLS, RBAC



# **SELinux FLASK Abstraction**

- FLASK plays a similar role to the TrustedBSD MAC Framework
  - Treats existing system components as "object managers"
  - Abstracts notions of subjects, objects, and methods
  - Label storage using SIDs (Security Identifiers)
  - Differences from MAC Framework are substantial
- Access Vector Cache holds cached computation results for SID and method tuples
- "Security Server" security policy implementation



# **SELinux Type Enforcement**

- Type Enforcement represents the set of permitted actions as rules in terms of:
  - Subjects (processes, generally) assigned domains
  - Objects (files, sockets, ...) assigned types
  - Object methods that may be performed on objects
  - Rules specifying permitted combinations of subject domains, object types, and object methods
- Labeling specification assigns initial labelsNew objects have labels computed from rules




# MAC Framework Modifications Required for SEBSD

- Framework parallel to LSM in construction
  - Similarity between LSM and MAC Framework simplify implementation; differences simplify it further
- Provides stronger label manipulation and management calls
  - Don't need a number of the system call additions required to run FLASK on Linux
- Removed notion of SID exposed to userspace since mature APIs for labels already existed
  - This approach later adopted in SELinux, also.



# Creating SEBSD Module from Largely OS-Independent FLASK/TE



## At start

- SELinux tightly integrated
  FLASK/TE into Linux
  kernel
- Over course of SEBSD work, similar transformation was made with LSM
- MAC Framework plays similar role to LSM for SEBSD



# **Current Status of SEBSD**

#### Kernel module "sebsd.ko" functional

- Most non-network objects labeled and enforced for most interesting methods
- File descriptor, privilege adaptations of MAC Framework complete

#### Userspace experimental but usable

- Libsebsd port complete, ports of SELinux userland programs completed as needed (checkpolicy, newrole, ...)
- Adapted policy allows many applications to run
  - Few changes needed for third party applications, mostly change required for base system components




# Strategy: Migrate MAC Framework to Darwin, Port SEBSD as SEDarwin

- Exploit common source code and design roots of FreeBSD and Darwin
  - Migrate MAC Framework to Darwin
    - And dependencies, such as extended attributes, etc.
  - Migrate SEBSD, MLS, and other policies to Darwin
  - Expand MAC Framework and policies to address Darwinspecific features, such as Mach IPC
    - Requires MAC Framework to sit across various layers
  - Modify Darwin userspace applications
  - Produce adapted SEBSD TE policy




# Strategy: Migrate MAC Framework to Darwin, Port SEBSD as SEDarwin (et al)







# Architecture of Darwin (Gross Over-Simplification)



- Mach provides lowlevel IPC, memory, synchronization primitives
- IOKit provides OO driver infrastructure
- BSD provides high level IPC, networking, storage services





# **Two Generations of Port So Far**

#### Experimental prototype on Jaguar

- Basic proof of concept:
  - Process, VFS labeling at BSD layer
  - Experimental work to explore Mach/BSD relationship
  - Experimental work to introduce Mach controls

#### Forward-port to Panther

- Bring port forward
- Correct substantial omissions (features, rigor)
- Move towards high levels of usability
- Draw useful conclusions regarding Mach, etc.




## **Technical Elements of Port So Far**

- Focus on getting base functionality running
  - Adapt to Mach memory allocation, synchronization
  - File system extensions, labeling, access control
  - Port support libraries/tools (libextattr, libmac, mac\_tools)
  - -Adapt base Darwin tools (system\_cmds, file\_cmds)
  - Port mac\_test, mac\_mls, SEBSD
  - Adapt to login environment differences
  - Extend MAC Framework to incorporate Mach tasks, IPC
  - Various other IPC work, such as sockets, System V IPC



# Integration of MAC Framework into Darwin Prototype





# **On-going Darwin Work**

- Working with various customers to improve productionability of system
- Porting additional FreeBSD elements over, such as network stack
- Integrating with Audit framework

- Porting Audit to FreeBSD

- Developing test tools and environments
- Collaborating with Apple to identify base OS requirements to do future work of this sort





## **Some Impressions of Darwin**

#### A very interesting experience

- Apple's use of FreeBSD greatly facilitates our work, but also general research/development on Mac OS X
- Unique blend of Mach and BSD components offers opportunities and substantial challenges
  - Mach IPC used extensively: cannot be overlooked!
- One of the biggest practical challenges was reproducing development environment outside Apple
- Customers love "Local extensions + Microsoft Office"
- Complexity of Mac OS X environment substantial



## **Impressions of Darwin (cont)**

- Apple can be a strong partner in open source
  - Still figuring out aspects of how to be open source, though
  - Very open to requests for change and help
- ABIs present a serious issue
  - Work towards kernel ABI/API stability via documented promises and resilient approaches will be important



# Conclusion

### A lot of exciting work going on

- TrustedBSD has brought many features to FreeBSD
  - Many more to follow, including Audit, more MAC support
- Port to Darwin offers both opportunities for research and substantial benefits for FreeBSD/TrustedBSD work
- SEBSD/SEDarwin bring experimental SELinux FLASK/TE functionality to FreeBSD and Darwin
- Successful transfer to \*BSD, Darwin, Linux, !open source

#### More information

- http://www.TrustedBSD.org/